

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----118737 281803Z /42
P 281015Z JUL 77 CITING HCS 2279W H/W ZDK MY 11363/1
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9705
SECDEF PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 11363

EXDIS

STATE FOR EA/GLEYSTEEEN

DEFENSE FOR ISA/ADMIRAL HILTON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: JA, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VISIT: MEETING WITH MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS HATOYAMA

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMCON OF SECRETARY BROWN'S
MEETING WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HATOYAMA AND OTHER
MOFA OFFICIALS JULY 27.

1. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS HATOYAMA SAID HE HAD READ JOINT
COMMUNIQUE WITH RKOK, WHICH SHOWED TWO COUNTRIES HAD REACHED
COMPLETE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS REASSURING TO JAPAN.

2. SECRETARY BROWN SAID PEACE AND SECURITY ON KOREAN
PENINSULA HAD TO BE SET IN BROADER CONTEXT PEACE AND SECURITY
IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AS A WHOLE. IN THAT REGARD, US-
JAPAN RELATIONS WERE VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENT. PRESENT
CONSULTATIONS WERE CONTINUATION OF THOSE BEGUN BY GENERAL
BROWN AND UNDERSECRETARY HABIB TWO MONTHS AGO WITH PURPOSE OF
INFORMING JAPANESE ABOUT PLANS FOR TROOP WITHDRAWALS OVER

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4-5 YEAR PERIOD. IN DESCRIBING STEPS US AND ROK PLANNED
IN ORDER TO HAVE SITUATION REMAIN STABLE WE WOULD SEEK JAPANESE
ADVICE. US INTENDED TO REMAIN ASIAN AND PACIFIC POWER
WITH STRONG FORCES IN WESTPAC, INCLUDING POWERFUL SEVENTH
FLEET; MARINE DIVISION AND AIR WING, LESS ONE BRIGADE, ON
OKINAWA; AND BASES IN PHILIPPINES AND ON GUAM. US MILITARY
CAPABILITY TO DEFEND KOREA AND JAPAN WAS CONSEQUENCE OF

THAT TOTAL STRENGTH.

3. ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF ROK WAS GROWING RAPIDLY. MOREOVER ROK HAD TWICE POPULATION AND FOUR TIMES GNP OF NK. ITS TECHNICAL ABILITY WAS GROWING, AND ITS PEOPLE WERE BETTER EDUCATED. IT ALREADY HAD STEEL AND PETRO-CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES AND BEGINNING OF ELECTRONICS AND SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIES AND THERE WAS BASIS FOR ARMS INDUSTRY ALTHOUGH ROK COULD NOT AT PRESENT PRODUCE HEAVY EQUIPMENT. WHILE WE RECOGNIZED NK HAD BEEN INCREASING MILITARY CAPABILITY SUBSTANTIALLY FOR 5-7 YEARS, SO HAD ROK. NK STILL OUT-NUMBERED ROK IN TANKS, ARTILLERY, AA WEAPONS AND APC'S, BUT AS WE WITHDREW FORCES OVER 4-5 YEARS WE WOULD HELP ROK TO INCREASE ITS CAPABILITIES IN THESE AREAS SO AS TO MAINTAIN STABLE MILITARY BALANCE. SECRETARY WAS SURE WE COULD DO THIS.

4. WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL AND WOULD ADJUST SIZE AND NATURE OF PACKAGE FOR ARMS TRANSFERS AS WE CONSULTED WITH CONGRESS.

5. SECRETARY SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY GIVEN PRESIDENT PARK LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER REITERATING US COMMITMENT TO US-KOREAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY. AS COMMUNIQUE RESULTING FROM SCM INDICATED, US AND ROK HAD AGREED AS FIRST STEP ON WITHDRAWAL BY DECEMBER 31, 1978 OF 6,000 OUT OF 33,000
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GROUND TROOPS, INCLUDING 2,900 FROM SECOND DIVISION AND 3,100 FROM OTHER NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS. CONCLUSION HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED ON SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWALS. MOREOVER, IT WAS AGREED HQ SECOND DIVISION AND HQ AND MOST OF PERSONNEL OF TWO BRIGADES WOULD REMAIN UNTIL FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF THESE UNITS. IN OTHER WORDS, BULK OF MILITARY CAPABILITY AND DETERRENT EFFECT WOULD REMAIN FOR EXTENDED PERIOD WHILE US AND ROK CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING UP ROK'S OWN CAPABILITY.

6. SECRETARY SAID STAFFS ON TWO SIDES HAD ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED GOOD DEAL OF WORK FOR SETTING UP COMBINED COMMAND WITH FOUR-STAR US GENERAL AND KOREAN DEPUTY. COMMAND WOULD BE ACTIVATED BEFORE FIRST INCREMENT OF WITHDRAWAL. UNC AND ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WOULD BE UNAFFECTED ALTHOUGH COMBINED COMMAND COULD COME TO ASSUME SOME UNC FUNCTIONS. IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUED MILITARY STABILITY WE WOULD BRING AIR FORCE CAPABILITY UPOYO FULL-WING, 72-AIRCRAFT STRENGTH WITH INCREMENT OF AIRCRAFT OUTSIDE OF KOREA. WE WOULD ALSO INCREASE NUMBER, SIZE AND FREQUENCY OF EXERCISES INVOLVING COMBINED FORCES.

7. ROK HAD ALREADY EMBARKED ON 5-YEAR FORCE-IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM BUT WE RECOGNIZED AS PART OF WITHDRAWALS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INCREASE ROK CAPABILITY MORE THAN HAD BEEN PLANNED. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR AIR DEFENSE, TANKS, ARMORED VEHICLES, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, COMMAND-AND-CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND AIR MOBILITY EQUIPMENT. INsofar AS POSSIBLE WE WOULD REPLICATE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES OF SECOND DIVISION. TRANSFER PROGRAMS WOULD INVOLVE DIRECT TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT FROM S9,\$ DIVISION; ADDITIONAL FMS OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS TO AUGMENT PRESENT PLANS RUNNING AT 200-300 MILLION DOLLAR PER YEAR (\$275 MILLION IN FY '78);

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 281015Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9706
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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AND THE ONE-TIME SPECIAL CREDIT OF SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS OVER TWO-YEAR PERIOD. IMPORTANT PART OF TRANSFER OF SECOND-DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE AT NO COST TO ROK BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN FUNDS FROM CONGRESS TO REPLACE SECOND-DIVISION EQUIPMENT. TENTATIVE LIST HAD BEEN AGREED UPON AMOUNTING TO SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS, WITH POSSIBLE INCREASE AMOUNTING TO FOUR TO FIVE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS.

8. US WOULD SUPPORT CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT KOREAN ARMS INDUSTRY AND SOME CO-PRODUCTION FOR KOREA ONLY. IT WOULD TAKE 6-8 YEARS BEFORE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ITEMS COULD BE PRODUCED BUT EVEN THEN ROK COULD NOT PRODUCE AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES. GREAT BULK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE PROVIDED BY ROK, BUT SECRETARY WAS CONFIDENT THAT WITH FMS CREDIT PLANS

COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THIS WAS AREA IN WHICH JAPAN COULD BE HELPFUL INASMUCH AS ROK ECONOMIC WELL-BEING DEPENDED ON INVESTMENT AND TRADE.

9. BOTH US AND ROK BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW UP PROPOSALA TO REDUCE TENTION, INCLUDING ROK PROPOSAL OF NON-SECRET

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AGGRESSION PACT AND PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER TALKS. SECRETARY WAS ABLE TO AFFIRM ON BASIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER THAT US WOULD NOT ENTER INTO TALKS WITH NK WITHOUT ROK. SECRETARY SAID PRC AND SOVIET UNION WERE FULLY AWARE OF COMMITMENT TO SECURITY ROK AND HE DID NOT BELIEVE EITHER WANTED TO SEE RENEWAL OF CONFLICT ON KOREAN PENINSULA.

10. TO SUMMARIZE, COMMITMENT TO ROK REMAINED UNCHANGED; WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MANAGED SO AS TO LEAVE NO DOUBT WITH NK, CHINA AND SOVIET UNION ABOUT COMMITMENT; US WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESENCE WESTPAC AND WOULD CONTINUE TO REMAIN ASIAN POWER. THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN FORCE LEVELS IN JAPAN, ALTHOUGH MINOR ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT BE MADE FOR EFFICIENCY. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT JAPANESE LEADERS AND ASK FOR THEIR VIEWS. SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO OBTAIN JAPANESE REACTION TO HIS PRESENTATION.

11. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HAVING HAD DETAILED EXPLANTION FROM GENERAL BROWN AND UNDERSECRETARY HABIB ABOUT WITHDRAWALS AND NOW HAVING HAD THE SECRETARY'S FRANK VIEWS, HE WAS PLEASED TO FIND OUT US HAD TAKEN JAPANESE CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT. GOJ HAD BEEN MOST CONCERNED THAT US WOULD GO AHEAD WITH WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM "AUTOMATICALLY", BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AFTER FIRST 6,000 TROOPS WITHDRAWN WE WOULD LOOK AT SITUATION AND THREAT AND MAKE OUR JUDGMENTS ACCORDINGLY, HATOYAMA REGARDED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED TO REAFFIRM THAT IN SPEAKING OF JAPANESE ASSISTANCE TO KOREAN ECONOMY SECRETARY INTENDED STRICTLY ECONOMIC SUPPORT, I.E. TRADE AND INVESTMENT; SECRETARY REPLIED THIS WAS CORRECT.

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12. DIRGEN AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU
YAMAZAKI ASKED ABOUT ROK REACTION TO SCENARIO AS

EXPLAINED BY SECDEF. SECRETARY BROWN SAID ROK MMD,
AND OWN STAFF, INCLUDING GENERAL VESSEY UNC,
HAD WORKED OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR FIRST INCREMENT TOGETHER.
SECRETARY BELIEVED ROKG ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES FOR FIRST
WITHDRAWAL STEPS AND COMPENSATORY METHODS. HE BELIEVED
GRADUAL NATURE OF WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN REASSURING AND WE
WERE WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER TO BUILDING UP A SENSE OF
SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. HE COULD NOT SAY ROK WAS FULLY
CONFIDENT, BUT AS WE BEGAN TO WORK OUT VARIOUS MEASURES
SUCH AS TRANSFERS AND BUILDUP HE THOUGHT ROK WOULD REALIZE
ABILITY TO MEET AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN DETERRENT WOULD
BE UNDIMINISHED.

13. DEPUTY MINISTER TAKASHIMA ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 281015Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9707
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y T E X T

STATE FOR EA/GLEYSTEN

DEFENSE FOR ISA/ADMIRAL HILTON

APPROVAL FOR TRANSFERS. SECRETARY SAID DETAILS
WERE STILL BEING FORMULATED BUT INASMUCH AS
WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM WAS BEING BACKLOADED, UNTIL IT
WAS COMPLETED SUBSTANTIAL FORCES WOULD REMAIN.
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS WOULD BE MADE IN VARIOUS FORMS
AND AT VARIOUS TIMES SO THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT PLANS
WOULD WORK EVEN IF WE DID NOT GET ALL WE ASKED FOR.

14. SECRETARY SAID UNLESS SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR PRESENT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, UNC WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST IN PARALLEL WITH COMBINED COMMAND. SOME OF SAME PEOPLE WOULD BE INVOLVED IN BOTH, AND IN TIME OF CRISIS EACH COMMAND WOULD OPERATE AS APPROPRIATE TO CIRCUMSTANCES.

15. DIRGEN ASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU NAKAE ASKED WHAT WE ANTICIPATED NORTH KOREAN REACTION WOULD BE TO WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM. SECRETARY SAID NORTH KOREA WAS ONE OF MOST
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OBSCURE AND HARD TO READ COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. WE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENT OF UNPREDICTABILITY AS SEEN IN BY RECENT HELICOPTER INCIDENT, WHICH DEMONSTRATED NK PROCLIVITY TO SHOOT FIRST AND ASK QUESTIONS LATER. SUBSEQUENTLY NK HAD NEGOTIATED MORE CALMLY FOR RETURN OF SURVIVOR AND BODIES.

16. NAKAE SAID GOJ HAD BEEN ASKED TO ASSIST ROK PROPERLY IN ECONOMIC AREA, BUT FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE WAS GETTING INVOLVED IN WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY BI-LATERAL GOJ-KOREAN MATTER WHICH WAS NOT OF DIRECT US CONCERN. HE WONDERED WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT INQUIRIES OF FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE, WHICH WOULD HINDER SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS IN JAPAN. TO SUPPORT ROK SECRETARY SAID US CONGRESS WAS WELL KNOWN TO HAVE INTERESTS IN ACTIVITIES OF COUNTRIES ALL OVER WORLD, INTERESTS NOT EASILY OR PROPERLY CONTROLLED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH. ONLY WAY SUCH INQUIRY COULD BE CHECKED WOULD BE BY CONGRESSIONAL SELF-RESTRAINT.

17. TURNING TO BILATERAL ISSUES, NONE OF WHICH, HE NOTED, WERE NEW, SECRETARY SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASING COST OF MAINTAINING US FORCES AND WAS PLEASED GOJ WAS WORKING ON MATTER. HE REALIZED LEGAL PROBLEMS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS BUT HOPED FOR SOME RELIEF. SECRETARY SAID HE ALSO WOULD LIKE TO ASK SUPPORT FOR INCREASED DEFENSE COOPERATION AS RAPIDLY AS POLITICAL SITUATION IN JAPAN WOULD ALLOW. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY PROGRESS OF SUBCOMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE COOPERATION AND IF POSSIBLE WOULD LIKE TO SEE JOINT PLANNING ADVANCED FOR DEFENSE OF JAPAN. FINALLY, SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO URGE AS HE HAD WITH MINISTER MIHARA THAT JAPAN DO MORE IN SELECTED DEFENSE AREAS SUCH AS ASW, AIR DEFENSE AND LOGISTICS. HE RECOGNIZED POLITICAL
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SENSITIVITIES BUT HE HOPED FOREIGN MINISTER COULD WORK TOWARD THIS END.

18. HATOYAMA SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE US DESIRES RE LABOR COSTS, BUT REVISION PRESENT SOFA WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. MOFA WAS STUDYING HOW TO WORK WITHIN SOFA AND WAS CONSULTING WITH FISCAL AUTHORITIES, BUT HAD TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN VIEW OF ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD BE RAISED IN DIET. FONMIN WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED ALONG LINES SECRETARY DESCRIBED IN REGARD TO JOINT DEFENSE COOPERATION. AS FOR JAPANESE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, HE NOTED "CERTAIN INCIDENT" HAD PREVENTED JAPAN FROM MOVING AHEAD BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO COOPERATE WITH JDA ON PROCUREMENT ITEMS. VARIOUS DIET MEMBERS WHO HAD GONE TO US TO LOOK INTO FX WERE CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASING PRICES THAT COULD AFFECT AIR DEFENSE IF JAPAN UNABLE TO BUY SUFFICIENT QUANTITY. IN GENERAL, JAPANESE POLITICIANS WERE STAND-OFFISH ABOUT PROCUREMENT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED JAPAN SHOULD HAVE SAME AIRCRAFT AS USAF.

19. SECRETARY BROWN SAID HE WOULD REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID TO MINISTER MIHARA ABOUT F-15. SOME PROBLEMS HAD ARISEN AS A RESULT OF HIS TESTIMONY. HE WOULD STAND BEHIND HIS REMARKS BUT NOT THEIR MISINTERPRETATION. SECRETARY WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ABILITY OF AIRCRAFT'S SYSTEMS TO OPERATE AGAINST GROUND CLUTTER AND JAMMING, BUT F-15 WAS STILL WORLD'S BEST FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. AS EVIDENCE HE HAD ASKED CONGRESS FOR MORE AIRCRAFT THAN PRESIDENT CARTER ORIGINALLY REQUESTED. IF THESE REMARKS WERE GIVEN AS MUCH PUBLICITY AS MISINTERPRETATION OF EARLIER REMARKS, IT MIGHT HAVE SALUTARY EFFECT.

20. RETURNING TO LABOR COSTS, YAMAZAKI SAID SOFA COULD NOT BE REVISED AND VERY DETAILED INTERPRETATIONS IN DIET WERE ALREADY ON RECORD. JAPAN WOULD DO WHAT
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IT COULD BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET SECRETARY'S HOPES UP. ON OTHER HAND, GOJ WOULD DO ITS BEST TO HELP OUT WITH BASE CONSOLIDATION AND REALIGNMENT.

21. EMBASSY LEAVES DISTRIBUTION OF MEMCON UP TO ADDRESSEES OR WOULD BE PLEASED TO ADD FURTHER DISTRIBUTION AS INSTRUCTED.
MANSFIELD

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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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Copy: SINGLE
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Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977TOKYO11363
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1898828
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VISIT: MEETING WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HATOYAMA FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMCON OF SECRETARY BROWN'S
TAGS: MARR, MASS, OVIP, JA, KS, US, (BROWN, HAROLD), (HATOYAMA, IICHIRO)
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e7c4676d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

